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ANITA DUMESNIL CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PATRICK C. CUMMINGS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CASE NO. 14611 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE! 
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Order and Modifi-
cation of Decree granted on the 5th day of May, 197 6, by the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft on Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause 
and Defendant's Petition to Modify Divorce Decree. Both par-
ties in person and by counsel, were sworn and each testified 
and presented documentary evidence in support of his or her 
position. 
This action was originally commenced by the filing, on 
December 14, 1972, of a Complaint by Plaintiff-Respondent, 
ANITA DUMESNIL CUMMINGS, against Defenant-^Appellant, PATRICK 
C. CUMMINGS, seeking a Decree of Divorce, control and custody 
of the three minor children subject to reasonable visitation 
privileges in the Defendant-Appellant, the family home and 
automobile, along with division of assets accumulated by the 
parties, attorneys1 fees, as well as alimony and child sup-
port. 
Defendant-Appellant answered and counterclaimed for 
a Decree of Divorce and other relief in an answer and counter-
claim filed January 5, 1973; the first of multiple supplemen-
tary proceedings was heard on an Order to Show Cause before 
the Honorable Marcellus K, Snow on the 7th of May, 1973. 
There Defendant-Appellant was ordered to provide certain tem-
porary support, assume certain liability, and the framework of 
visitation was there first established by court order. Mar-
riage counseling occurred by the Family Court Division, and it 
was the recommendation of the Family Court Commissioner that 
the divorce proceedings be allowed to proceed. Trial was held 
on the 19th day of December, 1973, before the Honorable G. Hal 
Taylor. Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
made and entered by the trial court, it was decreed that Plain-
tiff-Respondent would be granted a Decree of Divorce from 
Defendant-Appellant on the ground of mental cruelty; that cus-
tody of the three minor children, subject to reasonable visi-
tation, be granted Plaintiff-Respondent; that Defendant-Appel-
lant be ordered to pay Plaintiff-Respondent the sum of $125.00 
per month for the benefit of each minor child and $200.00 per 
-2-
month alimony; that the family home be Plaintiff-Respondent's 
sole property; and that Plaintiff-Respondent be granted cer-
tain other relief as against Defendant-Appellant. 
Plaintiff then moved for a new trial and for amendment 
of judgment in the motion filed January 23, 1974, said motion 
heard before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor on the 31st day of 
January, 1974. Judge Taylor at that hearing granted Plain-
tiff's motion for new trial on the issues of division of prop-
erty and alimony. Plaintiff-Respondent and Defendant-Appellant 
entered into a stipulation as between the parties dividing the 
property, defining the custody and rights of visitation, agree-
ing to child support of $375.00 on the facts that then existed, 
and agreeing to alimony in the sum of $285.00 per month, ter-
minating on Plaintiff's remarriage or death. Pursuant to the 
stipulation of counsel, the original Decree of Divorce entered 
on the 15th day of January, 1974, was modified by Amended 
Decree of Divorce entered the 26th day of June, 1974. 
Defendant-Appellant then caused to be issued an Order 
to Show Cause why Plaintiff-Respondent should not be held in 
contempt for selling and disposing of iteitis of personal prop-
erty and refusing to deliver other property awarded to him pur-
suant to the Amended Decree of Divorce; said Order to Show 
Cause was heard by the trial court on the 12th day of November, 
1974, and the parties were ordered to comply with the Amended 
Decree of Divorce. 
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Plaintiff-Respondent then moved for an Order to Show 
Cause why Defendant-Appellant should not be adjudged guilty 
of contempt for wilfully disregarding the Amended Decree of 
Divorce. Defendant-Appellant then responded with a verified 
petition for modification of decree and Order to Show Cause. 
The motions of the parties were consolidated and heard before 
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on the 5th day of May, 197 6. 
The order arising from that hearing is the subject of this 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's order 
and judgment with respect to the issue of alimony. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on the 30th day of June, 1962, 
in the State of California and were married approximately 12 
years. There were three children born of said marriage, Pat-
rick, Jr., presently age 13, Paul, presently age 8, and Mark, 
presently age 7, who now reside with Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Since the Decree of Divorce, each party has established a sep-
arate life, both entering into a long-term relationship with a 
member of the opposite sex, Defendant-Appellant having been 
remarried. 
Defendant-Appellant, until the present year had con-
-4-
tinued in the restaurant business. Plaintiff-Respondent was 
unemployed for a substantial period of time, but has now taken 
part-time employment. There exists as between the parties con-
siderable animosity and it is reasonable to believe that but 
for the shared relationship of the parties with their children 
and the financial responsibility of Defendant-Appellant that 
each would have severed totally their relationship. 
This matter has been adjudicated at length, and the 
court below has attempted to resolve by legal means a conflict 
that is essentially personal except as to the legal issues of 
support and visitation. 
Plaintiff-Respondent and Defendant-Appellant are both 
in their mid-thirties and are of normal mental and physical 
health. 
DISPOSITION IN LOITER COURT 
The order of the court entered the 3rd day of June, 
1976, includes the following provisions: 
(1) Judgment for Plaintiff-Respondent In the sum of 
$735.00 for accrued alimony for the months of March and April, 
1976. 
(2) An order that future payments be made through the 
Family Support Division of the court on the 1st and 16th of 
each.month in the sum of $330.00 for each half month. 
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(3) Setting a time certain for visitation on alter-
nate weekends as certain conditions for their return on Sunday. 
(4) Modification of the Decree allowing two weeks 
visitation during the summer to be taken in one continuous per-
iod or for two separate periods of one week each. 
(5) That each party should bear their own attorneys1 
fees and costs. 
This appeal is solely concerned with the order for 
alimony of $285.00 per month and takes no exceptions to the 
order of the court by the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on the 13th 
day of May, 1976. 
ARGUMENT 
For purposes of this appeal only the matter of alimony 
is brought before the Court for review. Appellant here concedes 
that the sum of $125.00 per month per minor child is not so ex-
cessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion for the contin-
uance of said sum in the order of the trial court. That on the 
same economic background, the issues of child support and ali-
mony are severable, is a matter of recent law (Dehm v. Dehm, 
545 P.2d 525 at 526/197$]). 
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY SUPPORTING APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS 
It is the contention of Appellant that his income has 
and continues to vary widely from year to year. Further, it is 
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contended by Appellant that his net economic position, apart 
from cash flow, has been in decline since the Amended Decree 
of Divorce. Appellant believes this contention is supported 
by testimony and the United States and Utah individual income 
tax returns for the years 1973, 1974 and 1975. For example, 
his adjusted gross income was $20,602.50 (R-106, 1. 15), his 
total Federal tax on income was $4,897.44 (R-106, 1. 22), his 
Utah State tax was $658.84 (R-110, 1. 17) in 1973, leaving Ap-
pellant a net income for that year of $15,705.06. 
In 1974 Appellant had an adjusted gross income of 
$27,046.00 (R-97, 1. 15). His total tax liability to the Fed-
eral Government was $4,403.00 (R-97, 1. 221), his Utah tax lia-
bility was $656.00 (R-105, 1. 19), for an after-tax income of 
$21,987.00. 
Whereas in 1975 Appellant had an adjusted gross income 
of $18,987.00 (R-87, 1. 15) with a Federal tax liability of 
$818.00 (R-87, 1. 20) and a Utah income tajc of $169.00 (R-96, 
1. 19), for a net income of $18,000.00, a variation of several 
thousand dollars occurred from year to year. One figure re-
mained constant, however, that was his support obligation ac-
cruing at the rate of $660.00 per month, ah annual liability of 
$7,920.00. 
In the above-mentioned years Appellant, with greater 
or lesser difficulty, could bear the order and support obliga-
-7-
tion. In 1976, however, certain events occurred that substan-
tially reduced the monthly adjusted income of Appellant. June's 
Cafe began losing money and was sold (R-124, 11. 12-30). A 
certain management contract referred to as the Freeway Insur-
ance Bank Contract terminated. Said contract had brough Appel-
lant a gross income of $500-$600 per month (R-124, 11. 2-11). 
Appellant's monthly salary dropped to approximately $775.00 
(R-125, 11. 1-9). The sale of June's Cafe with a payment of 
$25,000 was reduced by dispersals and obligations to the sum of 
$5,855.00. Appellant was awarded, as his sole and separate 
property, in the Amended Decree of Divorce, the equity in his 
then existing businesses. A predominant proportion of the pro-
ceeds of the sale of June's Cafe should be characterized as re-
turn of capital and is so recognized by both the United States 
Government and the State of Utah in their tax laws. 
A PORTION OF THE INCOME DERIVED FROM THE OPERATION 
OF JUNE'S CAFE SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE WORK OF 
APPELLANT'S WIFE. 
The form W-2 of June's Cafe for the taxable year 1975 
indicates an income from wages, tips and other compensation of 
$1,500.00 (R-87, attachment). Appellant testified, and it was 
uncontroverted that his present wife was employed on the average 
of 30 hours per week in the operation of June's Cafe. This an-
nual rate of salary is a gross monthly income of $125.00. It 
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can be reasonably interpreted from the testimony that Appellant's 
present wife contributed a substantial part to the gross income 
of the business by working for such a nominal wage. This is sup-
ported by testimony of Appellant (R-128, 11, 10-30); (R-129, 11. 
1-2). This testimony is in contrast with the uncontradicted tes-
timony of Appellant that Respondent, during the course of their 
marriage, never worked (R-30, 11. 13-16). Respondent testified 
that even after the divorce she worked only sporadically or 
part-time employment despite what she characterized as substan-
tial needs above and beyond the sum paid to her by Appellant 
(R-147, 1. 11.). ! 
It was the position of the trial court that a third 
party had not duty of support of minors with whom he might have 
social relationships (R-151, 11. 12-15)• It can be just as rea-
sonably held that Appellant's second wife has no duty of support 
of her husband's minor children. If the income generated by 
June's Cafe is properly attributed, in part, to the efforts of 
Appellant's wife, the Court, sitting in equity, should allow for 
this factor. 
DECLINE IN EQUITY OF ASSETS AWARDED APPELLANT OVER 
TIME. 
The assets now held by Appellant are in substantial 
part traceable to those assets awarded Appellant in the amended 
Decree of Divorce. For example, the proceeds of the Cross Roads 
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Restaurant, a sum of approximately $40,000, was eventually 
transmuted into the real estate contract now being paid Appell-
ant for the sale of June's Cafe (R-144, 11. 9-17). The pro-
ceeds of the Hub Five also ultimately were absorbed into the 
net equity of Appellant in June's Cafe (R-144, 1. 27-R-145, 1.3). 
Appellant has moved into a home with a purchase price 
less than one-half of that of his previous home (R-136, 11. 24-
30; R-137, 11. 16-21). Appellant further testified that he made 
no profit from the sale of his former home and faced a possible 
loss pending litigation (R-143, 11. 10-21). 
Appellant testified that his present motor vehicle had 
an out-of-pocket cost of $2,600.00, the remainder of the value 
having been provided by the equity in a truck previously awarded 
in the divorce decree as his sole and separate property (R-140, 
11. 19-24), said vehicle having been used in his trade or busi-
ness. 
RELATIVE ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCE OF RESPONDENT. 
Respondent testified that she was not employed at the 
time of the divorce (R-147, 11. 1-14), and had not been employedi 
except for a brief period at Christmas time in 1974 until tak-
ing her present position in June, 1975 (R-147, 1. 25-R-148, 1. 
20). She further testified that he expenses had not substanti-
ally changed between the time of the divorce and the present 
(R-148, 1. 21-R-149, 1. 16), and that her wage had been recent-
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ly increased (R-151, 1. 20-R-152, 1. 4). 
Respondent testified that she had no physical or men-
tal problems that would prevent her from working full time 
(R-149, 11. 25-30). Respondent testified that the hour that 
she returned home after working part-time was 6:00,6:30 or 7:00 
p.m., a time later than most full-time daytime positions would 
require. She further testified that all her children were in 
school (R-150, 11. 18-19). It may therefore be argued that the 
undertaking of a full-time job would take no more time away 
from Respondent's children than now happens, but rather an ear-
lier time for returning home might well occur. Respondent tes-
tified that the children are now alone until she returns from 
work (R-152, 1. 22-R-153, 1. 7). 
On redirect, Respondent testified that she had made no 
effort to improve her skills or obtain additional education or 
in other ways become more productive (R-153, 11. 21-30). 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY TO EXAMINE THE TOTALITY 
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF BOTH PARTIES AND DETERMINE 
THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY THAT WOULD BE EQUITABLE TO 
BOTH PARTIES. 
Speaking on the issue of modification of a decree of 
alimony, "...the courts upon the application of either party 
have the power to change, modify, or revise such a decree, and 
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whenever it is satisfactorily made to appear that the circum-
stances and conditions of the parties, or one of them, have 
changed so that the amount originally allowed is no longer just 
or equitable, the court may modify the same" (Buzzo v. Buzzo, 
45 Utah 625, 148 P. 362 at 36311915}). The changes that occur 
subsequent to a decree of divorce are those of the general hu-
man condition. Former husbands and former wives do economically 
better or worse, and it has been theposition of the courts over 
time that these changes should be recognized. 
"Again, suppose that a husband at the time a divorce 
is granted has ample means, and the court makes a liberal al-
lowance to the wife as alimony.... Further, that in such case 
the husband, after the decree is entered, and after the time 
for appeal has elapsed suffers financial reverses and loses the 
most, if not all, of his property or he is injured physically, 
or loses his health, and the allowance is no longer just and 
equitable; why should not the court, upon such a statement of 
facts being shown, modify the decree by decreasing or setting 
aside the allowance theretofore made" (Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 
456, 154 P. 952 at 955 £l916j) . The standard for modification 
remains as it has been historically that which is "reasonable 
and prudent" (Flannery v. Flannery, 536 P. 2d 136 at 138 £l975l). 
This Court has viewed the overall impact of court-
ordered division of property and support upon both the husband 
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and wife for some time: 
The object to be desired is to minimize 
animosities and to" let the dead past bury its 
dead" insofar as that is possible. The Court's 
responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just 
and equitable adjustment of their economic re-
sources so that the parties can jreconstruct their 
lives on a happy and useful basi[s. In doing so 
it is necessary for the Court td consider, in ad-
dition to the relative guilt or innocence of the 
parties, an appraisal of all the attendant-facts 
and circumstances: the duration of the marriage; 
the age of the parties; their scjcial positions and 
standards of living; their health; considerations 
relative to children, the money and property they 
possess and how it was acquired; their capabilities 
and training and their present ajnd potential incomes 
(Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 at 
979 C1956J). 
II 
THAT AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE pECREE TWO OF 
THREE CHILDREN HAD NOT YET STARTED SCHOOL, AND 
IT WAS ENVISIONED BY THE PARTIES IN THEIR STIP-
ULATED AGREEMENT THAT PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WOULD 
NEED SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO BE ABLE TO BE HOME WITH 
THE CHILDREN. SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CHANGED. 
At the time of the divorce Plaintfiff-Respondent, ex-
cept for a brief interval of temporary work, had not been em-
ployed during the course of their marriage. After the decree, 
Plaintiff-Respondent did not work before alll the children began 
attending school. At the present, Plaintiflf-Respondent works 
part-time in a position that requires later hours than the 
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usual full-time employment. 
In prior decisions this Court has placed emphasis 
on the contemplation of the parties and the trial court of 
the wife having or beginning employment at the time of the 
divorce decree in upholding the lower court's refusal to 
later modify the decree to reduce alimony (Short v. Short, 25 
Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 at 55 Cl97lJ ; Allen v. Allen, 25 
Utah 2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021 at 1022 £1970}). Such is not the 
case here. At the time of the divorce decree Plaintiff-Respon-
dent had virtually no work history and had two pre-school age 
children in her custody. It was then contemplated that she 
would not work. Years progressed, and Plaintiff-Respondent has 
taken employment. Each of her sons attends school during the 
day, and she, despite inflation, finds her overall dollar need 
no higher at the time of the motion for modification than at 
the time of the divorce. Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 
P.2d 620 at 623 (1972). 
That Plaintiff-Respondent is able to maintain the 
payments on a then new automobile is indicative of a lack of 
hardship and change of circumstance that should have been con-
sidered by the court below. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 
1359 at 1360 (1974). 
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Ill 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW BEING THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
HAS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE 
DEGREE THAT IF A MANIFEST INJUSTICE OR INEQUITY AP-
PEARS FROM THE RECORD THAT THE LOWER COURT MAY NOT 
BE REVERSED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
"In any event, solutions of these domestic problems 
are difficult and largely not capable of g. satisfactory solution 
either to the judge, or the parties. The court is often com-
pelled to use every ingenuity in order to stimulate human nature 
l 
to do its duty or its utmost toward fulfillment of that duty. 
This Court does not have those problems to meet. But in a num-
ber of cases, we have taken upon ourselves to modify decrees in 
ways which were insubstantial as compared to what is asked in 
this case" (Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 at 268 
Cl937-3) . There the court reversed on the facts and remanded 
the case to the lower court. 
The importance of the trial tran$cript, as it might 
indicate the accuracy of factual determinating is indicated in 
a recent decision of this Court, Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra. 
In the instant case it is the uncontradicted testimony of Defen-
dant-Appellant that a substantial change in his economic life 
had occurred in 197 6 and that the conditions that existed in 
1973, 1974 and 1975 no longer existed. It would be improper for 
the trial judge to speculate as to the futuire earnings of Appel-
-15-
lant when th only testimony on the record as to Defendant-
Appellant1 s present earning capacity showed a substantial de-
cline in salary and net worth. 
Although limited by some more recent cases, and the 
need for judicial finality in domestic relations cases, the 
holding in Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P.2d 277 at 
279 (1936), that this Court has the power to modify alimony on 
a sufficient showing of facts is today undisturbed: "...that 
if upon examination of the record, this Court is convinced 
that the award in the trial court is inequitable and unjust, it 
should direct such decree as it finds to be just and equitable." 
In a more recent case this Court held: "We remain 
aware of the prerogatives and broad discretion accorded the 
trial court in matters of divorce and supplemental proceedings 
therein. Nevertheless, this certainly does not extend to an ar-
bitrary and unreasoning power to disregard this proceeding be-
ing in equity, this Court may review questions of both law and 
fact the very purpose of which is to rectify errors where the 
evidence does not support the findings or where it clearly pre-
ponderates against them" (King v. King, 478 P.2d 492 at 495, 
496 C1970J). 
Again in family matters: "This is an equitable mat-
ter, and upon appeal the binding effect of the findings made by 
the trial court differs from that in a laiw matter. We may here 
review questions of both law and fact; and after making due al-
-16-
lowance for the advantaged position of th$ trial judge to ob-
serve the demeanor of witnesses upon the $tand, we may be per-
suaded that a finding is against the preponderance of evidence 
to such an extent that we would be justified in disapproving 
it or even making a finding of our own" ^Wiese v. Wiese, 24 
Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 at 505 C1970J), 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the lower court 
erred in ordering continuation of the alimony provisions of the 
Amended Decree of Divorce unchanged and that that order should 
be reversed upon its merits. 
Appellant 
225 South 200 East #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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